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and asked for a trial preference on the theory of constructive
indigency. Defendant offered to advance payment on all medical
expenses, and to contribute $30 to $40 monthly towards living
expenses. The appellate division, second department, in spite of
plaintiff's extensive injuries, 166 reversed an order granting a trial
preference stating only that the facts did not merit a preference.
Large hospital bills alone apparently do not constitute a sufficient ground for a preference, 167 and an offer of financial aid
from the defendant is a factor to be considered in opposition
to a motion for a preference on the ground of destitution.'
The defense bar. should thus note that, in cases involving potential
liability, an offer of financial assistance is one method of blocking
a "destitution" preference 6 9
CPLR 3403:

"Seider" plaintiff denied "attachment" preference.
In Margulies z. Boverman,10 plaintiff obtained in rem jurisdiction by attaching the obligations of the defendants' insurer
to defend and indemnify pursuant to the controversial procedure
authorized in Seider v. Roth.171 Having obtained jurisdiction,
plaintiff moved for a preference on the basis of Rule IX (2) of the
Bronx and New York County Supreme Court Rules.17 2
The Supreme Court, New York County, in denying the motion.
noted that personal injury plaintiffs may be entitled to a preference
where there are injuries resulting in permanent or protracted
disability or death; or where the interests of justice require an early
trial. Although the plaintiff in the instant case did come within
the literal meaning of- subdivision 2, that is, "[a]ny action on
contract, replevin or in conversion or wherein property is held
under an attachment which has not been- discharged . . . " the
court held that he did not 6ome within the spirit of the rule's
meaning when read as a whole' To grant a preference in such
a situation would be manifestly unfair to other personal injury

166 The dissent, in preface' to categorizing plantiff's injures, states "[tio list

all of her injuries in detail would be to give a brief lecture in human anatomy as'the injuries cover nearly every part of her body, from her head to
limbs."
Id. at 636, 286' N.Y.S.2d at 196. 167 Balestrero v. Prudential Ins. Co., 285 App. Div. 835, 137 N.Y.S.2d
134 (2d Dep't 1955) (mem).
168 Johnson v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 282 App. Div. 709,
122 N.Y.S.2d 44 (2d Dep't 1953) (mene.).
1694 WzmnsrTix, KoRN &- Mina, N-w YoRic Civm PRAcricE I[3403.13

(1965).

Misc. 2d 507, 288 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Sup., Ct. N.Y. County 1968).
17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). But see

17056

171

Podolsky v. DeVinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
72This rule implements CPLR 3403. "
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

plaintiffs.1 3 The court reasoned that subdivision 2 must either
apply to commercial actions or to all actions
wherein it is the
74
defendant who applies for the preference.
The court's decision appears to be especially sound in view
of the rationale underlying the grant of a preference in an
attachment situation. The preference is for the benefit of the
defendant so that his property is not unnecessarily encumbered
for long periods of time.
ARTICLE 50 - JUDGMENTS GENERALLY

CPLR 5001(a): Interest from time of accident denied in breach
of warranty action for personal injuries.
In Gillespie v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 7 5 the
Court of Appeals ruled on the question of whether or not interest
will be allowed from the date of injury' in personal injury actions
based on breach of warranty. Plaintiff, injured by flying glass
when a carton of quinine water exploded, contended that since
176
the action was based on "breach of performance of a contract"'
interest should be recoverable from the date of the accident.
In a previous warranty action for personal injury, Gellman
v. Hotel Corp. of America 7 interest was allowed from the
date of the accident. It was reasoned that since the action was
grounded in contract, interest should be allowed .17
Gillespie,
however, makes it clear that where the action is based on personal
injury, no interest will be allowed.
T

CPLR 5002:

Interest allowed from date of arbitration award.

By virtue of CPLR 5002, interest is recoverable upon a sum
awarded "from the date the verdict was rendered or the report
or decision was made to the date of entry of final judgment."
Until recently there has been some confusion as to whether or
not interest could be recovered on an arbitration award. Commentators have stated that since it is arguable that arbitration

56 Misc. 2d at 509, 288 N.Y.S2d at 734.
17Id.
'7521
N.Y.2d 823, 235 N.E2d 911, 288 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1968) (men.).
1
76 See CPLR 5001(a).
17746 Misc. 2d 521, 260 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Civ. Ct Bronx County 1965).
1.785 WzmsraTs
, KoRN & Mnm, NEW Yoax Civi. PR~cricE 15001.07
(1965). But see 7B McKIN NE's CPLR 5001, supp. commentary 84
(1967) (contending that although the action is nominally for breach of
17

warranty, it is in reality basically a tort action).

